Partial Service Disruption
November 16, 2026 1:07PM UTC
RESOLVED
Updated 11/16/2026@8:00AM EST
What happened
Start: Thursday 12 November 2026, 16:20 UTC. End of the impact: Friday 13 November, 16:10 UTC. The severity varied by region, connection method and time; access may have been partial or intermittent.
Exchange Online was hit hardest: most users could not reach their mailbox in Outlook or other mail clients, and email was delayed for many users.
Services named: Exchange, Copilot, Teams, SharePoint, OneDrive, Defender, Purview, Fabric, Intune, Planner, Power Apps, To Do, Power BI and Universal Print. Services that use Exchange Online mostly stayed online, but the parts that work with Exchange were affected.
The report names a software defect in Microsoft's own networking gateway as the cause. During the incident Microsoft also said it was not a cyberattack and that you do not need to change anything in your tenant.
Cause
According to the report, three factors came together and caused a global outage of the networking gateway in front of many Microsoft 365 services:
A latent defect: under certain load, Windows servers became overwhelmed and stopped responding. Inside an internal Windows process, tasks waited on each other (lock contention), which exhausted CPU and memory. The defect came from a fix prepared specifically for Microsoft 365 networking gateway servers; neither the defect nor the fix applies to other Windows deployments. The rollout began in July, went out safely and gradually worldwide, and ran for more than three months without issues. The test labs did not catch it: they focused on weaker hardware with fewer cores, while the problem is worse on newer machines with more cores.
A surge in load. Microsoft keeps two independent gateway systems for isolation and availability. About fifteen hours before the outage, Teams automatically failed over from the alternative gateway to the primary one, which also serves Exchange Online. That is normal and part of the resilience design, but it raised the load and changed the traffic pattern.
At the same time nearly 14% of the gateway's server capacity was out of service because of an unrelated issue the day before. It was on track to return through routine maintenance and had no effect on its own, because there was enough headroom.
Together, the extra load and the reduced capacity made the gateway hit the July defect, during the peak window of traffic in the United States. Requests built up until servers stopped responding. Automatic traffic management sent users to other healthy servers, but the same defect struck there: a cascade. Within two hours the defect had hit across the fleet, and at the lowest point more than 80% of servers did not respond. Normally partitions between components and regions stop this; because of a separate issue they did not, and the outage spread globally. Teams, OneDrive, SharePoint and the Office apps could fail out of the faulty gateway and so recovered earlier (Teams chats and meetings worked without issue for most of the outage). Exchange Online cannot do that for scale reasons.
Recovery took longer than usual: servers coming back were immediately overwhelmed by the waiting traffic and failed again, automated recovery was not designed for such broad failure, and because the defect was introduced months earlier the usual rollback, flighting and feature flags could not revert it quickly.
How it was fixed
Once the defect was confirmed, Microsoft built an update that returned the code path to the previously known good state in Windows. It was applied to part of the capacity at 07:20 UTC on 13 November.
Groups of servers were taken out of service, updated and restarted, then returned to service step by step, in large quantities at a time (for example 50% or more of a region).
In addition: traffic was moved to alternative connection paths, capacity was added, and the email delivery window was extended so delayed messages were not returned as undeliverable.
Timeline
July 2026: The change for the gateway servers starts to roll out and spreads worldwide over several weeks.
Thu 12 Nov, 01:07: Teams traffic is automatically failed over to the gateway shared with Exchange Online. Load rises gradually until 16:00; isolated server failures begin in some regions.
Thu 12 Nov, 16:20: Alert for Exchange Online and a notice in the Service Health Dashboard under EX1550543. Start of the incident.
Thu 12 Nov, 18:27: Notice MO1550821 for the other affected services, including Teams, Copilot and Defender.
Thu 12 Nov, 19:00: Microsoft widens the response and pauses all deployments and configuration changes.
Thu 12 Nov, 19:20: Finding: the high load is not caused by more traffic, but by many servers being unexpectedly unavailable.
Thu 12 Nov, 22:00 - 23:55: The first recovery actions do not work. Servers that come back fail again once they receive traffic.
Fri 13 Nov, 00:30 - 01:00: Connection negotiation is identified as the bottleneck: a process on the servers is overwhelmed.
Fri 13 Nov, 07:20: Mitigation found and applied to part of the capacity: an update that reverts the defective change.
Fri 13 Nov, 08:00 - 11:35: The update is rolled out step by step, first to regions in or entering peak hours. Asia Pacific is partly recovered around 11:00, Europe at 11:35.
Fri 13 Nov, 14:17: Global webmail availability is back at expected levels.
Fri 13 Nov, 16:10: No more active impact. Extended monitoring and clearing of the email backlog follow. End of the incident.
Sat 14 Nov, 04:15: Final updates to EX1550543 and MO1550821.
15 Nov: Date of the preliminary post-incident report.
20 Nov: Planned date for the full list of repair items (final report).November 13, 2026 9:54PM UTC
MONITORING
Updated 11/13/2026@4:55pm EST
From Microsoft:
As infrastructure stabilizes, we're still draining queued messages and rebalancing traffic, so customers may see improved sign-in/access while delivery and processing continue to catch up. We do not have an ETA for full recovery yet. Service access can recover before mail flow fully normalizes.November 13, 2026 7:14PM UTC
MONITORING
Updated 11/13/2026@2:15PM
From Microsoft:
We are deeply sorry for the disruption this incident has caused you and your business. We know the trust you place in our services and take that responsibility extremely seriously.
We are seeing broad recovery and stability across our services. This was a technical issue not related to cyber or AI / agents.
The incident was introduced by an issue during an earlier network capacity upgrade that surfaced following a recent network change. We have addressed the underlying issue and continue to restore service to remaining customers and regions.
Given the scale of demand, we restored services gradually, validating stability at each stage. While this took longer, it helped ensure a stable restoration. We will provide a full post-incident report once our review is complete.November 13, 2026 2:07PM UTC
INVESTIGATING
Updated 11/13/2026@9:00AM EST
We're continuing to see improvements in service availability, with email queues significantly reduced and approaching normal levels. Some users may still experience intermittent access issues or delayed email delivery as recovery continues.
We've implemented additional mitigation measures and are restoring the remaining affected infrastructure while investigating residual service issues. We're closely monitoring service health and validating recovery across affected connection methods to ensure sustained service stability.
At this time, we have no evidence of malicious activity associated with this incident. We will continue to treat this with urgency until full mitigation, and we will share a full Post-Incident Report with root cause and defense-in-depth actions after mitigation is complete.November 13, 2026 1:17PM UTC
INVESTIGATING
Updated 11/13/2026@8:17AM EST
We're seeing continued recovery progress across affected regions, with broader improvements now observed in North America and sustained improvements across much of Europe. We're also seeing encouraging recovery signals in Asia Pacific, although some users may continue to experience intermittent access issues or delayed email delivery as mitigation progresses across the remaining affected infrastructure.
Our focus remains on stabilizing recovered infrastructure, completing mitigation in the remaining impacted areas, and reducing delayed email queues and backlogs. We're closely monitoring service consistency and validating recovery across different connection methods as we work toward full mitigation.
At this time, we have no evidence of malicious activity associated with this incident. We will continue to treat this with urgency until full mitigation, and we will share a full Post-Incident Report with root cause and defense-in-depth actions after mitigation is complete.November 13, 2026 11:27AM UTC
IDENTIFIED
Updated 11/13/2026@6:30AM
We've made additional progress toward service recovery, with recovery actions completed across portions of the affected infrastructure in the Asia Pacific region. Traffic is being gradually restored, and we're seeing improvements in key customer scenarios, including mailbox access and delayed email processing. However, some users may continue to experience intermittent issues.
Our focus is now on extending these recovery actions across affected infrastructure in other regions, while continuing stabilization efforts and adding supporting capacity to improve service consistency.
Reducing email queues and backlogs remains a priority, and the extended 48-hour email timeout window remains in place to help protect delayed messages as delivery catches up.
At this time, we have no evidence of malicious activity associated with this incident. We will continue to treat this with urgency until full mitigation, and we will share a full Post-Incident Report with root cause and defense-in-depth actions after mitigation is complete.November 13, 2026 12:35AM UTC
IDENTIFIED
Updated 11/12/2026@7:35PM EST
While the servers we've returned to service initially remain healthy, we've observed that they can become unresponsive again once they begin receiving traffic. We're analyzing diagnostic data from these servers with our networking and platform experts to determine what's triggering this behavior.
Building on the protective traffic management measures we've implemented, we're also temporarily limiting which types of traffic can reach the affected infrastructure in specific locations. This will help us determine whether a particular type of request is contributing to the impact and allow us to restore service incrementally. Additionally, we're rebuilding a subset of affected servers using a previous software configuration to validate whether this prevents them from becoming unresponsive, and we'll expand this approach to additional servers if we observe positive results.November 12, 2026 11:21PM UTC
IDENTIFIED
Updated 11/12/2026@6:21PM EST
We've begun returning a portion of the affected servers to service, and they're remaining stable so far. We’ve also shifted traffic and connections to alternative pathways wherever possible and have observed limited recovery in some regions.
We've streamlined our recovery process to expedite returning the remaining affected servers to service. To further support recovery, we're implementing protective traffic management measures in a specific location to reduce load on the affected infrastructure, and we'll expand these measures to additional locations if we observe positive results. As capacity is restored, users may experience a gradual recovery as their clients reconnect to the service.November 12, 2026 10:15PM UTC
IDENTIFIED
Update 11/12/2026@5:15PM EST
We’re continuing to pursue all available pathways to restore service, as our actions taken thus far have not provided the anticipated relief. Our investigation has found that a core process on the affected servers is becoming overwhelmed, which causes the servers to stop responding and contributes to the capacity loss.
To validate a potential recovery approach, we're fully isolating a portion of our service infrastructure, restarting the affected components, and gradually reintroducing traffic to confirm our services remain stable before applying this approach more broadly. We're also analyzing traffic patterns across our entire service infrastructure and evaluating whether isolating traffic within each region may allow affected regions to recover independently.November 12, 2026 9:46PM UTC
IDENTIFIED
Update 11/12/2026 4:45PM EST
Users may be unable to connect to multiple Microsoft 365 services
Issue ID: MO1550821
Affected services: Exchange Online, Microsoft 365 suite, Microsoft Defender XDR, Microsoft Teams, SharePoint Online
Status: Service degradation
Issue type: Incident
Start time: Nov 12, 2026, 1:26 PM EST
User impact
Users may be unable to connect to multiple Microsoft 365 services.
More info
More info: Potentially impacted services include:
- Exchange Online
- Microsoft Teams
- SharePoint Online
- Microsoft Copilot 365
- Microsoft Defender XDR
- Microsoft Planner
- Microsoft To Do
- Microsoft Intune
- Microsoft Defender for Office 365
- Microsoft Purview: Multiple Purview services including Authorization, Auto Labelling, Data Loss Prevention (DLP), Communication Compliance, and Data Classification are impacted.
- Power BI: All users may intermittently be unable to export reports with MIP sensitivity labels to PDF in Power BI.
Scope of impact
This issue may affect users attempting to access the affected Microsoft 365 services.
Current status
Nov 12, 2026, 4:31 PM EST
We're continuing to work through restarting and validating the affected servers to safely return them to service, and we're exploring opportunities to expedite this process. In parallel, we're assessing whether reverting the small number of recent configuration updates we identified could help accelerate recovery.November 12, 2026 9:10PM UTC
IDENTIFIED
Updated 11/12/2026 4:10PM
We've validated an alternative health check method on a subset of affected infrastructure, which allowed the servers in that subset to successfully return to service, and we're now applying this change more broadly. We're also preparing an automated recovery process to continually detect and restart unresponsive servers, to help keep them in service while this change progresses. Additionally, our review of recent changes has identified a small number of configuration updates that we're investigating as potential contributors to the issue.November 12, 2026 8:20PM UTC
IDENTIFIED
Update 11/12/2026@3:20PM EST
Per Microsoft:
While we haven't identified any recent changes that correlate with the start of impact, our investigation indicates the failed health checks may originate from a specific component on the affected servers that's responsible for processing them. We're deploying a targeted change to bypass this component on a subset of servers to validate whether this restores availability, and we've taken steps to prevent additional servers from being removed from service while we work to return the affected servers to service. We're also investigating why affected servers are experiencing elevated processor usage while handling requests.
Per Microsoft @2:45PM EST
We've identified that affected servers are failing automated health checks, which is causing them to become unavailable, and this may be related to a recent change to a component involved in processing those checks. We're testing a configuration change on a subset of affected infrastructure to address this and, if successful, will apply it more broadly. In parallel, we've initiated a restart of all affected servers and are validating whether they're successfully returning to service.
This quick update is designed to give the latest information on this issue.November 12, 2026 7:31PM UTC
IDENTIFIED
Update 11/12/2026 @ 2:30 PM EST
We've completed redistributing connection traffic across our worldwide infrastructure, and we're moving additional traffic off the affected infrastructure to further reduce load. We're also restarting affected servers to return them to service. In parallel, we're investigating whether the elevated traffic reflects a genuine increase in requests or a shift in how traffic is being routed across our infrastructure.November 12, 2026 7:03PM UTC
IDENTIFIED
Update 11/12/2026 @ 2:00 PM EST
Users may be unable to connect to multiple Microsoft 365 Services
Issue ID: MO1550821
Affected services: Exchange Online, Microsoft 365 suite, Microsoft Defender XDR, Microsoft Teams, SharePoint Online
Status: Service degradation
Issue type: Advisory
Start time: Nov 12, 2026, 1:26 PM EST
User impact
Users may be unable to connect to multiple Microsoft 365 services.
More info
Potentially impacted services include:
- Exchange Online
- Microsoft Teams
- SharePoint Online
- Microsoft Copilot 365
- Microsoft Defender XDR
Scope of impact
This issue may affect users attempting to access the affected Microsoft 365 services.
Latest Status Update
Nov 12, 2026, 1:27 PM EST
We’re investigating an issue impacting multiple Microsoft 365 services and we've determined the affected infrastructure is experiencing elevated load across multiple regions, which is likely contributing to the connectivity errors. We're restarting and repairing impacted portions of this infrastructure to restore capacity, and reviewing an unexpected increase in a specific type of service traffic to determine whether it's contributing to the elevated load. In parallel, we're evaluating options to redirect traffic to alternate infrastructure to expedite relief.
We will provide updates as they are made available by Microsoft. You should also be able to track the issue on your MS Management console.
Thank you,
SilverSky Support
November 12, 2026 6:27PM UTC
IDENTIFIED
Update 11/12/2026 @ 1:25 PM
Users may be unable to connect to their mailboxes in Exchange Online through multiple connection methods
Issue ID: EX1550543
Affected services: Exchange Online
Status: Service degradation
Issue type: Incident
Start time: Nov 12, 2026, 11:17 AM EST
User impact
Users may be unable to connect to their mailboxes in Exchange Online through multiple connection methods.
More info
Potentially impacted connection methods may include:
- Outlook on the web
- Messaging API (MAPI)
- Exchange ActiveSync (EAS)
- Representational State Transfer (REST) API
Scope of impact
This issue may affect users attempting to access their mailbox in Exchange Online using the affected connection methods.
We will provide updates as they are made available by Microsoft. You should also be able to track the issue on your MS Management console.
Thank you,
SilverSky Support